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I. INTRODUCTION
A. INTRODUCTION
Verification and validation of computer simulations of
large complex systems such as theater level combat operations
is difficult at best. In practice, this is not a single
event, but continues to occur throughout the life of the
models involved. While the basic intent is to insure that the
model is true to its design and that the design reasonably
approximates reality, the effort also yields insight into
model sensitivity and possible utility of information
generated by the model.
The purpose of this project is to analyze an attrition
process in the context of its theater model. This study will
examine sensitivity with respect to certain variables, to
verify that the process, in this context, provides an
intuitively appealing output, and to look for items which may
be used as simple performance predictors in other aspects of
the model. The process under investigation is the Attrition
Calibration (ATCAL) process, used by the Army Concepts
Analysis Agency (CAA) as the attrition mechanism in its
theater-level models. Concepts Evaluation Model (CEM) and
Force Evaluation Model (FORCEM)
.
B. BACKGROUND
CEM is a deterministic theater model of ground and air
combat which has been developed through several versions since
about 1970. [Ref. l:pp. 1-11]
FORCEM is a more detailed computer simulation model
portraying combat, combat support, and combat service support
in a theater of operations. It is a fully-automated,
deterministic, and time-stepped model, with a module for each
major functional area being activated once each twelve-hour
time cycle. It was developed by CAA during the period 1982-
1984, and is now operational. Applicat: ns are in studies
that determine the capabilities of current combat forces;
requirements for support forces; and requirements for
personnel, supplies, and major items of equipment. [Ref. 2:p.
2]
ATCAL is an Attrition Calibration Model which was
developed in the early 1980 's by CAA for use in the CEM and
FORCEM theater level simulations. ATCAL consists of a number
of non-linear equations which can be used to compute weapon
systems attrition of opposing forces (if values for several
input parameters are known) . The same equations can be used
"backwards" to determine values for the parameters from the
output of a higher resolution model such as CAA's divisional
Combat Sample Generator (COSAGE) . The ATCAL process contains
both an attrition model and a consistent calibration
procedure.
The ATCAL model does not step through time, but rather
reflects the casualty rates of the division level engagement
to which it is calibrated. [Ref. 3:p. 6-1]
Operational use of FORCEM in 1987 and early 1988 generated
a backlog of corrections, enhancements, and new developments
which were desired in the model. In May 1988, a task force
was constituted within CAA to address these needs in a two-
phased program. As part of phase one, an analysis was
conducted to determine how certain aspects of the model,
including the mechanics of forming combat engagements and
certain computer-science related issues, affected the
attrition process.
Other tests have also been conducted at CAA which examined
sensitivities of various aspects of the COSAGE-ATCAL-FORCEM
integrated system of models. These controlled tests have
generally shown ATCAL to be robust, but have pointed out some
areas of interest for further testing. These areas and the
areas of interest found through the task force phase one
analysis form the base from which this study is derived. The
specific focus of this study is to examine some of the
sensitivities of ATCAL in its operational setting. [Ref. 4]
ATCAL itself is sensitive to rate of fire and engagement
frontage [Ref. 3:pp. 6-11]. The actual effect of these
sensitivities has never been analyzed in FORCEM operational
data. It is appropriate to analyze model results with respect
to these sensitivities to verify that the results are sensible
in the simulation. Where these parameters can be adequately
controlled, they may also provide mechanisms through which
other desired effects can be infused into the FORCEM Model
[Ref. 5:p. 1].
C. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH EFFORT
The purpose of this study is to perform a graphical data
analysis of the sensitivities of ATCAL with respect to FORCEM
operational data. Given a history of ATCAL results from
various FORCEM runs, appropriate graphical techniques will be
applied to illustrate the sensitivity of ATCAL within the
FORCEM Model to the effects of frontage of engagement and
presence of important weapon systems.
This is important in light of the previous tests done on
sensitivities of the COSAGE-ATCAL-FORCEM integrated system of
models. Graphical analysis will provide the first step in the
effort to understand the sensitivity of ATCAL within the
FORCEM model.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A . DATA
The data used in this analysis is drawn from 2 day combat
simulations between a Blue defending force and a Red attacking
force. This FORCEM basic data will be referred to as FB. A
comparative run was also made using a version of FORCEM which
restricted the number of engagements each unit could be
involved in per time period so that the number of extremely
small engagements was reduced. This set of data of FORCEM
restricted engagements will be referred to as FR.
A third set of data was developed by incorporating the
version of ATCAL found in CEM into the FORCEM model. This was
done to examine the effect in FORCEM of certain processing
differences found in the CEM ATCAL. This data set will be
referred to as FC.
The characteristics of each of the data sets can be seen
in Tables I and II. The data sets were run through the
Statistical Analysis System (SAS) using the procedure
Univariate to get the results for Table I. The complete
output for each of the data sets is in Appendix A.
TABLE I
DATA SETS
FB - FORCEM BASIC DATA
FR - FORCEM RESTRICTED ENGAGEMENTS DATA
FC - FORCEM DATA USING CEM • s VERSION OF ATCAL










* ENGAGEMENT-LEVEL TOTALS ONLY
TABLE II
VARIABLES
TIME Day or night engagement
BRD Posture of the blue forces ( i.e., defend, delay)
BLUE Blue unit involved in the engagement
FBLUE Fraction of the blue unit involved in the
engagement (i.e., .33, .5)
RED Red unit involved in the engagement
FRED Fraction of the red unit involved in the engagement
(i.e., .65, .10)
FRONT How large a front size the engagement takes place
on
AST A number which represents the different assets of
both the red and blue units (i.e., 5-tank for blue,
53-tank for red)
OHAND The number of a particular asset which is available
at the beginning of the engagement.
HITS The number of that particular asset which were hit
during the engagement
KKILL The number of that particular asset which were
killed during the engagement
GLOBE The system value which is assigned that particular
asset
TOASCW The total combat worth of that asset (number of
assets on-hand at the beginning of the engagement









The lost combat worth of that asset at the end of
the engagement (the number of assets hit or killed
times their system value)
The total blue combat worth (all the blue assets
time their system value sum together at the
beginning of the engagement)
The number of blue assets lost during the
engagement times their system value.
Initial force ratio (red's total combat
worth/blue's total combat worth at the beginning
of the engagement)
Final force ratio (red's total combat worth at the
end of the engagement/blue's total combat worth at
the end of the engagement
Number of red tanks on-hand at the beginning of
the engagement
Number of red tanks hit during the engagement
Number of red tanks killed during the engagement
Number of blue tanks on-hand at the beginning of
the engagement
Number of blue tanks hit during the engagement
Number of blue tanks killed during the engagement
B. METHODOLOGY
Exploratory data analysis techniques are to be utilized
to analyze the data described above. The data will be
manipulated first using SAS . Subsets of each of the data sets
will be put into the GRAFSTAT Package to take advantage of the
exploratory data analysis techniques which are available
within this package.
Using the techniques provided by both SAS and GRAFSTAT
this study will attempt to answer the following questions:
- What effects do frontage changes have on the response of
ATCAL in FORCEM?
- Is an increase in final force ratio associated with an
increase in frontage?
- How does the presence or absence of important weapon
systems in an engagement change the performance of ATCAL
in FORCEM results?
- Is there a noticeable change in results when a weapon is
absent from an ATCAL engagement?
In reality, an increase in the frontage size might be expected
to show an increase in the final force ratio if everything
else in the engagement is held constant. We will investigate
the response of ATCAL to changing frontage in this study.
Similarly, if a weapon system is really important to a unit
the absence of this system should cause noticeable changes in
the results of the engagements. The killing potential of the
unit should be less, so then there are fewer enemy assets
being killed. We will attempt to determine if the results
from ATCAL confirm this.
There will also be an attempt to identify questions which
cannot be answered within the scope of this study or the data
provided for future studies.
III. ANALYSIS OF FRONTAGE EFFECTS
Frontage is the width of the area that a defending unit
must control. In the military sense, a unit can control the
area by physically being there, or by having the ability to
observe the area and deliver effective fire onto it.
Given a fixed size for a defending unit (i.e., a fixed
combat worth) , it would seem that, as the unit is assigned a
larger frontage to defend, its ability to accomplish the
mission would decrease as the size of the front increased.
Alternatively, a fixed size unit attacking on decreasing
frontages might expect increased losses as its maneuver room
is reduced. Frontage changes would naturally be a part of any
combat model which has attacking and defending forces.
In FORCEM, the frontage associated with a specific
engagement is calculated as follows: Engagement Frontage =
1/2 [Fraction of Red Division in that Engagement * Red
Division Frontage + Fraction of Blue Division in that
Engagement * Blue Division Frontage] . The division frontages
are computed from corps frontages as 1/N * [Corps Frontage]
where N is the number of divisions in the corps. Corps
frontage is determined from the corps boundaries which are
input by the model operator and intended to represent
realistic frontages for the units and operations involved.
Units are apportioned for combat against enemy units by a
process based on range. [Ref. 2:pp. 6-11]
The data sets from both versions of ATCAL were
investigated to see if changes in frontage size had any effect
on the final force ratio. Final force ratio is the ratio of
the number of operational red weapon systems times their
system values, divided by the number of operational blue
weapon systems times their system values at the end of the
engagement.
An example of how final force ratio is computed: At end
of an engagement all the operational red weapon systems are
counted, (5 Tanks, 6 BMPs , 4 Helicopters) , the number of
operational systems is then multiplied by the system value for
that system (Tank = 1.0, BMP = .4, Helicopter = .7) and all
of these numbers are added together to get the combat worth
of the red unit which is also the numerator of the final force
ratio. The system value of a system is input by the model
operator. The same procedure is done for the blue units and
this total combat worth is used as the denominator of the
ratio. [Ref. 2]
It is important to take into account the initial force
ratio when examining the relationship between frontage and
final force ratio since this will also have an effect on final
force ratio. The initial force ratio (that is the ratio of
the number of red weapon systems times their system values,
divided by the number of blue weapon systems times their
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system values at the beginning of the engagement) , final force
ratio, and frontage size were the three variables in the data
sets which were investigated.
To investigate the possibility that changes in the
frontage size have no effect on the final force ratio a subset
of each of the data sets were made. The subset contained all
the engagements where the forces were in the most intense
conflict during the day.
Figure 1 depicts a graph of the subset for data set FC.
It shows the final force ratio grows rather slowly with the
initial force ratio for any fixed range of frontage sizes.
This is not what is expected to happen, there should be a
tendency for the final force ratio to increase as the frontage
size increases. Figure 2 displays two graphs. The top graph
shows the empirical density of the initial force ratios vs.
the different frontage sizes and the lower graph shows the
empirical density of the final force ratios vs. the different
frontage sizes. In comparing the two graphs it is apparent
at all the frontage sizes that the final force ratios have
longer tails toward the higher ratios than do the initial
force ratios. The largest changes take place between a
frontage size of 5500 meters and 6500 meters. Figure 2 does
show that there is some change between final and initial force
ratio at all frontage sizes. Although the greatest change
takes place where the frontage sizes goes from 5500 meters to
6500 meters, this is not what is expected, the largest changes
11
Figure 1. Final Force Ratio Plotted as a Function of Initial
Force Ratio and Frontage Size (N=143) , Data=FC
Figure 2. Empirical Densities of Initial and Final Force
Ratios Conditioned on Frontage Size (N=143) (Data=FC)
should be seen at the higher frontage sizes. Thus, increases
in frontage size do not have a large effect on the final force
ratio.
Figure 3 depicts the final force ratio plotted against the
initial force ratio conditioned on the frontage size changes.
For every point that lies above the line y=x, blue is losing
his combat worth at a greater rate than red considering the
initial force ratio and the frontage size. Below the line,
red is losing at a greater rate. Thus, there is a tendency
at the nominal Cosage 3:1 ratio (this is the ratio at which
it would be favorable for a unit to attack and win the
engagement) , red is consistently losing a higher combat worth
proportion relative to blue over all different frontage sizes.
It is not until the initial force ratio is larger than 4:1
that the blue force consistently loses a higher combat worth
proportion relative to red. It would seem appropriate that
at high initial force ratios we should expect to see decisive
outcomes, but this is not shown true in Figure 3. The growth
of the final force ratio as the initial force ratio increases
is relatively slow across the entire range.
A graph of the subset of FR data set is Figure 4. As with
the FC data set it does not appear that there is any change
in the final force ratio as the frontage increases from this
view. The graph in Figure 5 represents the empirical
densities of both the initial force ratio and final force
ratio against different frontage sizes. The densities at all
14
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Figure 4. Final Force Ratio Plotted as a Function of Initial






Figure 5. Empirical Densities of Initial and Final Force
Ratios Conditioned on Frontage Size (N=133) (Data=FR)
frontage sizes are less peaked in the graph of the final force
ratios than in the graph of the initial force ratio. The
tails in the final force ratio graph are longer toward the
higher frontage sizes than are those in the initial force
ratio graph. There is no particular region of frontage sizes
where the increase of final force ratio is that much greater
than the initial force ratio as shown in Figure 2 . There is
a change between the distribution of initial and final force
ratios at all frontage sizes, but the change between the
ratios does not tend to be higher at the high frontage sizes
as would be expected. Figure 6 depicts the same graph as
Figure 3, except that the subset of FR data set is used in
place of the FC data set. Again it is shown that not until
the red force has obtained an initial force ratio larger than
a 4:1 ratio does the blue force consistently lose a higher
combat worth proportion relative to the red force and this is
true over the ranges of frontage sizes. There is no evidence
of a decisive outcome at high initial force ratios.
The subset of FB data set is depicted in Figure 7. In
this figure there appears to be an increase in the final force
ratio as the frontage size increases. There also tend to be
many more engagements taking place at smaller frontage sizes
than were present in the other two data sets. This occurred
because command and control rules in FORCEM allowed a unit to
engage all enemy units in range. These rules were changed
because it was believed so many small engagements are not
18
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desirable in a theater level model. The graphs in Figure 8
display the empirical densities of both the initial force
ratio and final force ratio against different frontage sizes.
There is a noticeable difference between the density of the
final force ratio and the initial force ratio with respect to
the thickness of their tails at the higher ratios. A lower
overall range of initial force ratios leads to a noticeable
migration to lower final force ratios. The range of initial
and final force ratios is lower than the range for the FR and
FC data. The mode of distributions occurs at lower initial
force ratios and is higher compared to the other data sets.
Also, there is mc : e spreading of the data in the final force
ratio. Figure 9 indicates the same graph as seen in Figure
3 and 6 except with the subset of FB data set. As with the
other graphs, the blue force does not consistently lose a
higher combat worth proportion relative to the red force until
the initial force ratio is higher than a 4 to 1. In fact,
where the frontage size is between 2400 and 7650 meters the
red force needs at least a 5 to 1 ratio to win consistently.
Although in this figure it can be seen that narrow frontage
does not point to high initial and final force ratio, it also
points to many small engagements which is not considered
desirable in a theater level model.
More specifically, in the investigation of changes of
frontage size and how they affect the final force ratio in the
FORCEM, the following information has been revealed:
21
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Figure 8. Empirical Densities of Initial and Final Force
Ratios Conditioned on Frontage Size (N=408) (Data=FB)
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Changing of frontage sizes show no significant affect in
the final force ratio. There is a slight tendency for
the final force ratio to increase at all frontage sizes,
but the increase is not significant at the larger frontage
sizes as would be expected. Thus, frontage changes have
no significant affect on final force ratio.
In order for the red force to consistently lose a lower
combat worth proportion relative to the blue force over
all the frontage sizes, the red force must have an initial
force ratio higher than 4 to 1. Decisive outcomes do not
take place when the attacker has a 10:1 ratio and this is
definitely opposite to what is expected in a model.
The combat mechanism used in generating data set FB
produces a large number of small frontage, low force ratio
(and, therefore, small combat worth) engagements, which
are far from the division vs. brigade type engagements
which are desired in a theater level model. They
dissipate the attackers force unrealistically
.
Between the data set FB and the data sets FC and FR there
is a different response: In FB there are many low initial
and final force ratios data points at all ranges, where
as in FC and FR the initial and final force ratios data
points change distribution with range. Also there are
larger engagements in the FC and FR data sets. These last
two observations are positive results for the model in
that they are consistent with what is expected.
IV. ABSENCE OF A MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM
A major weapon system is any weapon system which, when
removed from a unit, will degrade the ability of that unit to
accomplish its mission. The major weapon system which will
be investigated in this thesis is the main battle tank. The
main battle tank is the backbone of the heavy combat divisions
deployed throughout the world. The question which will be
investigated is: How does the absence of an important weapon
system affect the performance of ATCAL in FORCEM results?
A subset of the FR data set which comprises all
engagements where the forces were in the most intense conflict
during the day was used to analyze the question.
The analysis was undertaken using two different
approaches. In the first, a single set of data was analyzed
to investigate the effect of removing an entire system type.
However, problems were encountered with this portion of the
analysis, so it was abandoned in favor of an approach which
used two subsets of data with different force mixes to address
the question. For the sake of completeness, the first method
is described briefly before describing the second method.
In the first method, the final force ratios (red/blue)
were calculated for a number of different engagements from the
FORCEM results with all the weapons systems present. Then the
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main battle tank was removed from the blue units and the final
force ratios were recalculated.
The final force ratio without the main battle tank minus
the final force ratio with the main battle tank was calculated
for all the engagements. This difference was then plotted
against the fraction of the force made up by the main battle
tank. The logarithms of the force ratio differences were
plotted to reduce the crowding of the points [Ref. 6:p. 178].
A linear regression of the log of the differences vs. the
fraction of the force made up by the main battle tank was
performed and the fitted line was drawn on the graph, using
the least square and the scatter plot functions of GRAFSTAT.
This was done to check if there existed an association between
the log of the differences of the final force ratios and the
fraction of the force made up by the main battle tank. The
graph in Figure 10 displays the scatter plot with the fitted
line. There does appear to be an increase in the difference
of the final force ratios as the fraction of the force made
up by the main battle tank increases. This increase cannot
be proven statistically significant for at least two reasons:
the plot of the residuals was not normal and the values for
the correlation coefficient were low. This indicates a lack
of confidence in the association seen; and is probably due to
the relatively large variance in the predicted variable and
possibly due to the lack of a linear relationship.
FRACTION OF BLUE FORCE THAT IS MAiSi BAHLE TANKS
Figure 10. Scatter-plot of the Log of Difference Between
Final Force Ratios vs. the Fractions of the Blue Force that
is made up of Main Battle Tanks with a Least Squares Fit for
the Straight Line (N=18) (Data=Subset of FR)
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In order to prove statistically that the absence of an
important weapon system affects the performance of ATCAL in
FORCEM results a second analytical approach using the Chi-
Square test for differences was undertaken [Ref. 7:p. 153].
To perform this test the tank loss fraction of the blue units
with a certain main battle tank was calculated and it was also
calculated for the blue units without that main battle tank.
The tank loss fraction was calculated in the following manner:
Total combat worth of blue tanks lost
Tank loss fraction =
Total combat worth of the blue tanks in
the engagement
for both sets of blue units. The tank loss fraction was also
calculated for red units with a certain red main battle tank
and red units without that red main battle tank. Contingency
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* Actual frequency will be placed in
these cells
The first contingency table was used to test if there was
a difference between the lethality of blue units with the main
battle tank and the blue units without the main battle tanks.
The second contingency table was used to test if there was a
difference between the vulnerably of the blue units with the
main battle tank and the blue units without the main battle
tank. Similar contingency tables were used to test the red
units to see if any difference existed between the units with
the main battle tank and those without the main battle tank.
The complete calculations are located in Appendix B for both
the blue and red units. The results were that there was no
significant difference found between the lethality of the red
units with the main battle tank and those without the main
battle tank. There was a significant difference between the
lethality of the blue units with the main battle tank and the
blue units without the main battle tank. There was no
significant difference between the vulnerability of the blue
units with the main battle tank and the blue units without the
main battle tank. No difference was found between the
vulnerability of the red units either.
These findings by themselves do not answer the question
of whether the absence of a major weapon system affects the
performance of ATCAL in FORCEM results, because certain
characteristics of the forces or systems themselves may
confound these results. For example, the tank absent from the
blue force may actually be a more potent killer but have the
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same vulnerability as the other tanks in the blue force, or
it may be present in a force with some other potent killer
which makes it appear more lethal in the red tank loss column.
On the red side, the designated tank may be present or absent
in numbers too small to affect the overall kill or
vunlerability rates.
In order to qualitatively assess whether differences in
force composition may be influencing the analysis, the star
symbol plots will be used. The star symbol is an interesting
way of graphing multivariate data so that you can visually
compare the different units. Each star represents one blue
unit. There will be two sets, the blue units with the
designated main battle tank present and those without the main
battle tank. For this study the rays will represent the
number of tanks, helicopters (helos) , and anti-armor guided
missiles (ATGMS) the unit has. The helicopters and anti-armor
guided missiles are the two other major tank killing systems
in the battlefield within the model. [Ref. 6:pp. 155-159]
Figure 11 shows a representative of the star symbol plot and
it has each of the rays labeled with the weapon system it
represents. This star symbol plot is the legend for the star
symbol plots found in Figures 12 and 13.
The force composition may be compared both within and
across the data sets using Figures 12 and 13. For instance,
the units represented in Figure 12 appear to be reasonably




Figure 11. Star Symbol Plot with the Rays Labeled to
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Figure 12. Star Symbol Plot of the Blue Units with
the Main Battle Tank
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igure 13. Star Syinbol Plot of the Blue Units Without
the Main Battle Tank
fluctuation in the fraction of helicopters and ATGMS present.
In Figure 13 there appears to be a stable tank fraction
present, but more variability in the helicopter and ATGM
fractions. Between Figures 12 and 13 these combined
differences, while not excessive, may be enough to influence
the loss fractions of tanks for the engagements used in this
analysis. Because the data provided does not specify
precisely which systems killed which, it is not possible to
take the analysis any further.
No hard line conclusions can be drawn about the model due
to the small sample size of data that was available to test
for differences in ATCAL performance. However, the results
seem to point to the fact that when a major weapon system is
absent some other system or systems compensate for the absence
of the major weapon system. This observation needs more
definite data to study then is available for this study. From
the results of the Chi-Square test for difference only one of
the four tests made was able to reject the hypothesis that no
difference existed between the units with the main battle tank
and the units without the main battle tank. The graph in
Figure 10 tends to show an increase in difference as the
fraction of the force made up by the main battle tank
increases, but no statistical significance can be proven.
The results from the Chi-Square tests for difference show
less effect in the data due to the absence of a major weapon
system than might be expected, but in light of other factors,
34
it is hard to attribute this observation to the performance
of ATCAL. The small sample size available, differences in the
forces involved, and lack of specific killer victim
information all influence this analysis and weaken any
conclusion with respect to ATCAL performance. However, the
techniques employed here would be appropriate in conducting





The purpose of this thesis was to analyze an attrition
process in the context of its theater model. A graphical data
analysis of the sensitivities of ATCAL with respect to FORCEM
operational data was performed. Given the ATCAL results from
various FORCEM runs, the sensitivity of ATCAL within the
FORCEM model to the effects of frontage of engagement and
presence of important weapon systems was investigated. The
following observations have been made:
- Changing of frontage size show no significant effect on
the final force ratio.
- In order for the red force to consistently lose a lower
combat worth proportion relative to the blue force over
all the frontage sizes, the red force must have an initial
force ratio higher than 4;1. Decisive outcomes do not
take place when the attacker has a 10:1 ratio.
- Large numbers of small frontage, low force ratio
engagements, which are far from the division versus
brigade type engagements which are wanted in a theater
level model, dissipate the attacker force.
- Restricting the number of engagements each unit can be
involved in per time period so that the number of
extremely small engagements are reduced causes the initial
and final force ratios data points to change distribution
with range. Also there are larger engagements taking
place which are positive results for the model.
- Absence of a major weapon system seemed to have only
limited effect on the ATCAL results tested, but several
factors may have influenced these results. More detail
and control is required in the data to be able to draw
ATCAL specific conclusions.
B. POSSIBLE CORRECTIONS
The method which was used in data sets FR and EC so that
the unit does not get involved in too many engagements in a
time period should be retained in FORCEM so that the number
of small engagements will be reduced.
The process for calculating the engagement frontage in
FORCEM requires further testing and possible modification so
that frontage will have a discernible effect on the outcome
of battle.
C. ADDITIONAL POSSIBLE AREAS OF STUDY
If there is additional interest in the sensitivities of
ATCAL with respect to FORCEM, topics remaining open for
research are:
- The effect of removing a major weapon system needs to be
further studied with more detailed data.
- What effect does the wide variation in size and force mix
of engagements have on the performance of ATCAL?
- What important change in response is due to special
systems such as close air support?
In order to perform any of the above mentioned areas of
research basic knowledge of both the ATCAL and FORCEM model
is recommended. Also close coordination with CAA is necessary








N A7487 SUM WGTS 47487
MEAN 4.87355 SUM 231431
STD DEV 2. 9125 VARIANCE 8.48267
SKEWNESS -0.0711565 KURTOSIS
1530697 CSS 402808
CV 59.7613 STD MEAN 0. 0133653
T:MEAN=0 PROB>|TI 0. 0001








N 47487 SUM WGTS 47487
MEAN 12.6844 SUM 602342
STD DEV 5.4131 VARIANCE
SKEWNESS 0. 105552 KURTOSIS
USS 9031740 CSS 1391420
CV 42. 6754 STD MEAN 0. 0248404
T:MEAN=0 510. 634 PR0B>IT| 0. 0001




































































N 47487 SUM WGTS 47487
MEAN SUM 2923050
784. 324STD DF/ 28: 0058 VARI.ANCE
SKEWNESS -0. 39991 KURTOSIS
USS 217171980 CSS 37244393
45.4974 STD MEAN 0. 128517
t)mean=o PROB>iT| 0. 0001
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N 47372 SUM WGTS 47372
130140MEAN 2.74719 SUM
STD Dr/ I. 82658 VARI.\NCE 3.33639
SKEWNESS KURTOSIS 2.00127
CSS
66. 489 STD MEAN 0. 00839223
T:MEAN = 327.349 PROB> ITI
SGN RANK 561038439 PROB> |s|
NUM -= 47372
QUANTILES(DEF=4) EXTREMES
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N 19985 SUM WGTS 19985
MEAN 103341 SUM
"nimnSTD DEV 214^. 63 VARI.A.NCE
SKE-v-NESS 0. 343905 KURTOSIS
USS 2. 135E-14 CSS 9. 192E*10
C7 2.07529 STD MEAN 15. 1705
0. 0001T:MEAN=0 prob>>t;



















































































































































































































































































































































N 19985 SUM WGTS 19985
MEAN 5.57662 SUM 111449
STD DEV 5. 81112 VARIANCE 33. 7691
4. 47509SKEWNESS .. 99941 KURTOSIS
.296349 674842
.04.205 STD ME-\N 0.0411062
T:MEAN=0 PRQB>iTI 0.0001
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N 651 SUM WGTS 651
MEAN 5.87358 SUM 3823.
7







CV STD MEAN 0. 247646
T:MEAN = 23. 7176 PROB>IT| 0. 0001











































































II 651 SUM WGTS
uPlhl4. 50763 SUMSTD DEV VARIANCE











































.:MEAN=0 25.7149 PROB>|T| 0.0001
SGN RANK 106113 PROB> S 0.0001
NUM -=
QUANTILES(DEF=4)
100*; MAX 435.9 99% 263.648 LOWEST HIGHEST
75% 03 73.7 95'' 169.74 4 275.1
50% MED 39 90', 119.22 4 299.2
25% 01 21. 3 10'! 12. 72 4. 1 422







COUNT J1 COUNT/ NOBS 0.
UNIVARIATE
MOMENTS




SID DEV VARIANCE 18. 0705
SKZraESS 2. 74596 KURTOSIS 10.0592
USS CSS 11745.8
CV STD MEAN 0. 16660!
T:MEAN=0 PROB:HTI
SGN RA.MC 105138 PROB:>is|
NUM -= 648
QUANTILES ( DEF = 4 ) EXTREMES
100^ MAX 30.3 99", 23.463 LOWEST HIGHEST
75°: 03 4. 9 95' 11. 84 25.2
50'^ MED 2.4 90'' 8. 38 26. 3
25% 01 1. 1 10'^ 0.5 28, 6
0% MIN 5°; 0. 3 0. I 28.8


































































































CHI-SQUARE TEST FOR DIFFERENCE
TANK LOSS FRACTION
BLUE UNITS BLUE UNITS RED UNITS RED UNITS
WITH MAIN WITHOUT MAIN WITH MAIN WITHOUT MAIN
BATTLE TANK BATTLE TANK BATTLE TANK BATTLE TANK
.376 .208 .166 .160
.149 .244 .111 .145
.325 .358 .144 .065
.233 .352 .179 .184
.374 .274 .132 .042
.298 .258 .203 .158
.168 .309 .160 .031
.289 .254 .141 .173
.134 .314 .217 .051
.236 .392 .183 .137
.324 .106 .058 .132
.318 .261 .025 .052
.392 .349 .092 .034
.372 .197 .194 .063












The following equation was used:
T
e.: > 5
The level of significance—a=.05.
- Actual frequency
- Expected frequency
R^ - Row total
Cj - Column total
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There is no difference between the vulnerability of
the blue units






























There is a difference
X^ = 3.841
.95
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Hq: There is no difference between the vulnerability of
the red units
























There is no difference between the lethality of the
blue units
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